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The electronic sports industry, also known as eSports, has experienced a 
boom in popularity and revenue in recent years, with professional leagues and 
teams sprouting worldwide. It is a space in which video games, professional 
players, team franchises, fans, sponsors, and league organizers converge to form 
a new market that is expected to exceed one billion dollars in revenue in 2020.1 
The meteoric rise of the electronic sports industry is undeniable and everyone, 
including professional sports owners, celebrities and venture capital firms, wants 
to be a part of this space.  
A little less than ten years ago, only a miniscule percentage of people, 
outside of South Korea, knew the term “eSports.” Since then, eSports has grown 
into a billion-dollar industry with an audience, in the tens of millions, that 
watches competitive eSports. These viewers watch as their favorite eSports 
player or team compete for the millions of dollars that is given out as prize money 
at these competitive eSports events. Esports is a perfect combination of 
entertainment and sports and unsurprisingly its events attract even more unique 
viewers than traditional sports.2 
In some respect, eSports is the modern-day sport. Some eSports programs 
even have organizational structures that resemble traditional sports, with leagues, 
 
*  I have been fascinated with the eSports space for over a decade and would like to 
thank Professor Ruben Garcia for his support and contribution to this topic. 
1  NEWZOO, GLOBAL ESPORTS MARKET REPORT (2020), https://newzoo.com/ 
insights/trend-reports/newzoo-global-esports-market-report-2020-light-version/#:~: 
text=Highlights%3A,from%20media%20rights%20and%20sponsorship. 
2  See Annie Pei, This Esports Giant Draws in More Viewers Than the Super Bowl 
and it’s Expected to Get Even Bigger, CNBC (Apr. 14, 2019), https://www.cnbc.com 
/2019/04/14/league-of-legends-gets-more-viewers-than-super-bowlwhats-coming-
next.html (noting the popularity in the eSports space and comparing the viewership 
of eSports to major traditional sports). 
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teams, players, and even coaches.3 Like traditional sports, eSports require fans, 
professional players, franchises, team owners and league operators to succeed.4 
However, despite the similarities, eSports differs from traditional sports in that 
the game publishers own the intellectual property of their video games and are 
in complete control of the industry.5 This creates a situation where a game 
publisher can maintain complete control of professional competitions involving 
its video games by forming the league itself. 
Unlike traditional sports though, eSports is still in its infancy. As of now, the 
biggest eSport programs are Riot Games’ League of Legends and Blizzard 
Entertainment’s Overwatch. These two eSport programs are still maturing. 
However, Riot Games’ League of Legends and Blizzard Entertainment’s 
Overwatch eSports model may serve as the template for the rest of the industry 
and is closely monitored by others within the eSports space.6   
In recent times, the eSports industry has been raising questions about 
employment terms, contract provisions, and labor laws. Currently, many eSports 
players are primarily compensated as freelance contractors through cash prizes 
for winning tournaments, though some of the more accomplished players do 
receive salaries.7 As the eSports industry continues to grow, eSports player 
unionization should be considered by, not only, the professional players, but by 
the operators of leagues as well.  
 
3  See About IESF, INT’L E-SPORTS FED’N, https://www.ie-sf.org/about/#member-
nations (outlining the International e-Sports Federation’s mission and listing the 
member nations) (last visited October 28, 2020). In 2016, the United Kingdom 
attempted to regulate eSports for a second time, but this time the United Kingdom’s 
government chose to work with an independent governing body, known as the British 
Esports Association.  
4  See Juliana Koranteng, The Crossover – What Esports and Traditional Sports are 
Learning From Each Other, http://mediatainmentfinance.com/index.php/66-the-
crossover-what-esports-and-traditional-sports-are-learning-from-each-other (last 
visited October 28, 2020) (identifying the similarities between the major traditional 
sports and eSports).   
5  This is a distinct and important difference as no one owns the game of American 
football. Thus, any individual can start a new league. Such was the case when the 
American the Alliance of American Football league was in February 2019. Whereas, 
a league may only be started with the permission of the video game publisher in 
eSports. See Thom Craver, What is the Alliance of American Football? New Football 
League Starts in February, CBS NEWS, https://www.cbsnews.com/news/alliance-of-
american-football-what-is-new-football-league-starting-in-february, (last updated 
Jan. 21, 2019). 
6  See Nick Fernandez, The Biggest Esports Tournaments and Leagues in 2019 and 
Beyond, ANDROID AUTH. (Aug. 18, 2019), 
https://www.androidauthority.com/esports-tournaments-leagues-963799 (providing 
information on the biggest eSports tournaments and leagues). 
7  See William Welser, Why eSports Players Need to Unionise in 2019, WIRED (Jan. 
6, 2019), https://www.wired.co.uk/article/esports-unions (stating that professional 
eSports players are primarily compensated as freelance contractors through 
tournament winnings and that players currently receive less than fifteen percent of 
the revenue). 
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In 2017, Riot Games, the publisher of League of Legends, launched a League 
of Legends Players Association (known as “LoL PA”).8 Although the LoL PA 
was a step forward for eSports player unionization, it is still not a union.9 The 
LoL PA has been criticized as a company union, which has no legal basis to 
collectively represent the LoL players.10 However, Riot Games maintains that 
“the players have not given up any guaranteed rights under the National Labor 
Relations Act” and that “the Players’ Association provides centralized 
representation for players in tri-party negotiations.”11 Notwithstanding Riot 
Games’ claims, the plain language of section 8(a)(2) of the National Labor 
Relations Act prohibits employer financial support to achieve a collective 
bargaining agreement.12  
Unlike League of Legends, the players association in Overwatch was started 
and led by workers of Overwatch.13 In fact, the Overwatch Players Association 
(known as “OWPA”) was created and led by a former professional Overwatch 
player.14 The OWPA has adopted some aspects of the National Football Players 
Association.15  
Despite the uncanny similarities between eSports and professional sports, 
eSports still suffers from uncertainty. More specifically, it is unclear whether 
professional players in the eSports industry are employees or independent 
contractors.  
Given the game publishers’ control over their video game and the 
 
8  See Ferguson Mitchell, Riot Updates on Status of NA LCS Franchising and 
Players’ Association, THE ESPORTS OBSERVER (Sept. 23, 2017), 
https://esportsobserver.com/riot-updates-status-na-lcs-franchising-players- 
association (providing details regarding the development of the North American LCS 
and North American LCS Players’ Association). 
9  See Minnie Che, Is Riot Games in Violation of the NLRA for Funding its Own 
Union?, ONLABOR (May 1, 2019), https://onlabor.org/is-riot-games-in-violation-of-
the-nlra-for-funding-its-own-union (explaining that Riot Games may be in violation 
of the NRLA with its league-funded North American LCS Players’ Association).  
10  Id. 
11  Ellen M. Zavian & Jim Schmitz, Genesis of an Industry:  
The Emerging Workforce and Regulations of eSports, DOCKET (Apr. 04, 2019), 
https://www.accdocket.com/articles/emerging-workforce-and-regulations-of-
esports.cfm. See also LoLeSports Staff, Evolution of the NA LCS, RIOT GAMES, 
https://nexus.leagueoflegends.com/en-us/2017/01/evolution-of-the-na-lcs-2 (last 
visited October 28, 2020) (discussing changes to the league structure, including 
changes that give professional players more of a voice and better protections). 
12  See 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2). This means that players would have to form their own 
union.  
13  See Mallory Locklear, Two Major eSports Players Associations Are in the Works, 
ENGADGET (Mar. 15, 2018), https://www.engadget.com/2018/03/15/overwatch- 
counter-strike-players-associations-in-the-works (noting the development of players 
associations within the eSports space and how eSports is beginning to resemble 
traditional professional sports). 
14  Id. 
15  Id. 
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professional scene, especially the players themselves, professional eSports 
players will likely be considered employees of the game publishers under the 
National Labor Relations Act, and thus should be eligible for unionization. It is 
this control that video game publishers have that places professional players in a 
risky position with regards to their rights. Considering this imbalance of power, 
professional players should seek to establish an employment relationship with 
the various video game publishers and a collective bargaining unit. By 
establishing and recognizing the employee status of professional players, a 
degree of balance can be imparted and will give the professional players, 
amongst other various benefits, the ability to collectively bargain and/or strike, 
protect their earnings in the event of injury, secure healthcare or retire benefits 
and negotiate revenue-sharing agreements.16  
Unionizing would benefit professional players such that they will be able to 
standardize their employment conditions possibly improve upon them. 
Moreover, the establishment of collective bargaining will also benefit the 
operators of the leagues/video game publishers, as it will give them the benefit 
of the anti-trust exemption and help them avoid any violation of anti-trust or 
labor laws. Challenges exist with unionizing the eSports industry; however, it is 
in the interest of both the professional players and the operators of leagues to 
establish collective bargaining.  
This paper will examine the present-day laws to determine whether 
professional eSports players are employees of video game publishers, and how 
best to ensure that their rights are protected as the eSports industry continues to 
develop. Due to the extensive buildout of certain video game franchises and the 
ongoing mission to advance the eSports professional scene of certain publishers, 
this paper will only focus on issues facing League of Legends and Overwatch, 
and its respective professional players. Part I of this paper will provide 
background information of what eSports is and explain the structure of 
professional League of Legends and professional Overwatch. Part II of this paper 
will examine the applicable federal employment laws and determine whether 
professional players are considered employees of their respective game 
publishers aka league operators under the applicable laws. Part III of this paper 
will explore the rights professional currently lack and the potential benefits of 







16  See William Welser, Why eSports Players Need to Unionise in 2019, WIRED (Jan. 
6, 2019), https://www.wired.co.uk/article/esports-unions (explaining the need for 
unionization for professional eSports players to secure protections found in other 
industries).  
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II. BACKGROUND 
 
A. I Am a Newbie: What is eSports? 
Short for electronic sports, eSports describes the organized world of 
competitive video gaming at a professional level. In the same way that 
conventional sports like soccer and golf hold tournaments for the top teams and 
players in the world to compete for cash prizes and glory, eSports does the same. 
Esports bring individual players and teams to compete in competitive video 
games like League of Legends and Overwatch. Moreover, in the same way that 
conventional sports like football and basketball draw in tens of millions of fans 
and viewers, eSports does the same. Esports games are popular with casual 
players of the game and followed by tens of millions of fans around the world. 
These fans attend live events or tune in online to watch as their favorite digital 
athletes and teams play in real time. 
 
B. Current Structure of Professional League of Legends and 
Overwatch. 
Professional League of Legends and Overwatch involves much more than 
the team organizations and professional players themselves. It involves the 
publishers, Riot Games and Blizzard Entertainment, and the leagues, the League 
of Legends Championship Series (“LCS”) and Overwatch League (“OWL”). 
These actors all deal with the professional players in some capacity or another. 
The LCS is a professional eSports league for League of Legends, a 
multiplayer online battle arena (“MOBA”) video game from Riot Games. The 
LCS maintains regional leagues in North America, Europe and Asia, whose top-
performing teams are qualified to enter the League of Legends World 
Championships. It directly deals with the professional scenes in various regions. 
Further, it is responsible for establishing the rules for professional League of 
Legends play and dealing with professional players who have qualified for the 
League of Legends Championship Series.17  
The rules of the LCS are published each season. For the most part, the LCS 
regulates the actions of players and teams based on their published rules and the 
League of Legends ‘Summoner’s Code’ as contained in Riot Games’ End User 
License Agreement.18 Moreover, the LCS regulates the ‘player agreements’ 
between players and teams to a certain extent, as well as player management by 
 
17  League of Legends Championship Series & LCS Academy League, 2019 Official 
Rules LCS and LACS (2019), https://nexus.leagueoflegends.com/wp- 
content/uploads/2019/01/2019-LCS-Rule-Set-v19.3_uh6o67g0zd58db0o5p08.pdf. 
18  Riot Games Terms of Service, RIOT GAMES, https://www.riotgames.com/en/ 
terms-of-service (last updated Jan. 15, 2020). 
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their respective teams as set forth in these player agreements.19 All these rules 
and agreements govern professional League of Legends play. 
The LCS is owned by League of Legends Championship Series LLC, a 
Delaware Limited Liability Company. The League of Legends Championship 
Series LLC is a subsidiary of Riot Games, a California corporation. The LCS has 
an extremely close relationship with Riot Games, and is in privity with, or an 
alter ego of, Riot Games. As such, for the purposes of this paper, Riot Games’ 
rules and regulations can be treated as LCS regulations. 
Like the LCS, the OWL is a professional eSports league for Overwatch, a 
team-based multiplayer first-person shooter video game from Blizzard 
Entertainment. The OWL is owned by Activision Blizzard, Inc., a Delaware 
Corporation. As a part of Activision Blizzard’s eSports strategy, it has 
restructured its internal organization such that the Major League Gaming 
business, which includes the OWL and other eSports events, operates as a 
division of and is governed by Blizzard Entertainment. As such, Blizzard 
Entertainment is the entity that establishes the rules for professional Overwatch 
play and the one that deals with team organizations and professional players.20 
For the purposes of this paper, Blizzard Entertainment’s rules and regulations 
can be treated as OWL regulations.  
The OWL maintains a league with twenty teams from around the world; 
thirteen are based in North America, two in Europe, and five in Asia.21 It deals 
with the North American, European, and the Asian professional scenes. 
Although the franchises span across multiple continents, they are all governed 
by the same OWL regulations.  
Currently, the OWL sets the rules and regulations governing professional 
Overwatch play across the globe.22 The OWL regulations and interactions with 
players and teams are mainly based on the published rules and code of conduct 
set forth by Blizzard Entertainment. Moreover, the OWL regulates player 
management by their respective teams such that signed players are paid a 
minimum annual salary set by the league, provided health and retirement 
benefits, housing, training support, and bonuses.23  
It is important to note that the professional League of Legends and 
Overwatch players are most likely employees of their respective franchised team. 
 
19  League of Legends Championship Series, supra note 17.  
20   Rules of Competition and Code of Conduct, OVERWATCH LEAGUE (Feb. 09, 
2019), https://overwatchleague.com/en-us/news/21568602/rules-of-competition-
and-code-of-conduct. 
21  Teams, OVERWATCH LEAGUE, https://overwatchleague.com/ 
en-us/teams (last visited October 28, 2020). 
22  Overwatch League, supra note 20. 
23  Bryce J. Jackson, Hey Blizzard, Where’s That OWL Players Union?,  
CAREFUL 4 SPOILERS (Jan. 24, 2019), https://www.careful4spoilers.com/blog/hey-
blizzard-wheres-that-owl-players-union.  
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Not only do the teams provide pay to players, the teams also exercise high levels 
of control over players. Further, it is important to note that although professional 
players may have an employment relationship with their respective teams, this 
relationship does not prevent them from also having a legally recognized 
employment relationship with another entity. This paper does not address the 
relationship between the professional players and their respective teams, rather, 
it seeks to determine the employment status of professional players in relation to 
the publishers and the leagues. 
 
C. The National Labor Relations Act 
 
The National Labor Relations Act bestows upon employees the right to 
unionize, engage in collective bargaining with their employer(s), and act for 
mutual aid and protection.24 Any union that secures support from a majority of 
the employees at the workplace is certified as the exclusive bargaining agent for 
all the employees.25 Although employers may come to unilateral decisions over 
some of their policies regarding employees, mandatory subjects of bargaining, 
such as wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment must be 
discussed with the union.26  
All the major traditional professional sports leagues have professional 
players’ association. The NBA has the NBPA, the NFL has the NFLPA, and so 
on.  Traditional major sports are governed by collective bargaining agreements 
that are entered between the owners through the leagues and the professional 
players through the players’ associations. Unfortunately, this is not the case in 
the LCS or OWL.  
There are no players’ unions, collective bargaining agreements, or even 
mandatory subjects of bargaining in eSports.27 Many of the terms and conditions 
of employment are found within the agreements signed 1) between the 
professional players and teams, 2) between teams and Riot Games, and 3) 
between Riot Games and the professional players. Theoretically, professional 
players can bargain for better terms and conditions, however, in practice it is 
nearly impossible to do as the professional players do not have the kind of 
leverage that comes with being part of a certified union. If a union were to be 
formed, it could potentially force Riot Games to discuss terms and conditions of 
employment, including rules that arbitrarily punishes professional players, that 




24  National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1935).  
25  Id. at § 159(a). 
26  Id.  
27  Jackson, supra note 23. 
28  Id.  
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D. Professional Gamer Contracts 
 
Professional players have been as young as fifteen years old when first 
entering into a contract.29 The age of majority for a person to achieve full legal 
capacity to enter into a professional gamer contract depends on the jurisdiction. 
In the United States and Europe, for the most part, the age of majority is 
eighteen.30  
The game publishers have significant influence over the contracts between 
the professional players and the teams.31 For teams to compete in the publishers’ 
games, they must adopt the game publishers’ conditions and standards and 
incorporate them into their professional gamer contracts.32 These professional 
gamer contracts tend to require players wear certain brands or logos, live in a 
specific location, be subjected to disciplinary actions for their conduct, and 
provide services exclusively to that organization.33 Typically, this level of 
control is exercised by an employer. As such, the question of whether game 
publishers are employers arises.  
 
III. ANALYSIS: ARE PROFESSIONAL LEAGUE OF LEGENDS AND 
OVERWATCH PLAYERS EMPLOYEES OF THEIR RESPECTIVE VIDEO 
GAME PUBLISHERS? 
 
The relationship between an employee and an employer is governed by law, 
not by the employer’s judgment. This relationship, or employment status as an 
employee or independent contractor, can be very important, because it 
significantly impacts one’s rights in the workplace and the remedies available 
for unlawful conduct by the employer. Employees are defined by federal law and 
are protected and governed by both state and federal laws. Whereas, independent 
contractor rights are primarily governed by state contract law. As such, the 
 
29  The Top 10 Current eSport Athletes, GAMEDESIGNING.ORG (Aug. 25, 2020), 
https://www.gamedesigning.org/gaming/esport-athletes/. 
30  See Age of Majority, EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS, 
https://fra.europa.eu/en/publication/2017/mapping-minimum-age-
requirements/age-majority (last visited Oct. 25, 2020) (stating that the age of 
majority in all European Union Member States, except for Scotland, is eighteen years 
and children are considered to have full legal capacity from the age of sixteen);  
see also Sheri Stitof, Legal Age of Adulthood by State, LIVEABOUT.COM, 
https://www.liveabout.com/age-of-majority-chart-2300968 (last updated Apr. 09, 
2018) (noting the age of majority by State in the United States). 
31  See Ellen M. Zavian & Jim Schmitz, Genesis of an Industry: The Emerging 
Workforce and Regulations of eSports, DOCKET (Apr. 04, 
2019), https://www.accdocket.com/articles/emerging-workforce-and-regulations-
of-esports.cfm. 
32  Id. 
33  Id.  
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employee status for professional League of Legends and professional Overwatch 
players necessarily turns on the employment definitions of federal law.  
 
A. Federal Labor Laws That Govern 
 
The United States has a variety of comprehensive labor laws designed to 
safeguard employees from abuse by their unscrupulous employers.34 These laws 
provide important rights to employees, particularly the right to collectively 
bargain.35 Moreover, these laws still apply even if actors attempt to implement 
contractual obligations to eliminate them.36 However, for such rights to attach, 
individuals must satisfy the definition of ‘employee’ under the statutes that 
govern.37 Further, for the federal government to have power to regulate an 
industry, the industry must sufficiently impact interstate commerce.38  
 
1. The Definition of an Employer and Employee Under the NLRA 
 
The key issue here is whether professional LCS and OWL players are 
employees under Federal Law. The law governing this issue is the National 
Labor Relations Act.39 The NLRA was enacted “in 1935 to protect the rights of 
employees and employers, to encourage collective bargaining, and to curtail . . .  
labor and management practices” that harmed “the general welfare of workers, 
businesses and the United States economy.”40  
The act defines ‘employer’ broadly and in very general terms. The plain 
meaning of “employer” is one who employs employees to work for wages and 
 
34  There are states that have passed laws reinforcing and expanding the federal 
protections guaranteed under federal labor laws. See Labor Laws and Issues, 
USA.GOV, https://www.usa.gov/labor-laws (last visited October 25, 2020). 
35  See National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1935) (declaring that 
employees have the right to self-organize and bargain collectively for their mutual 
aid or protection). 
36  See Sec’y of Labor v. Lauritzen, 835 F.2d 1529, 1545 (7th Cir. 1987) 
(Easterbrook, J., concurring) (noting that statutes enacted to grant workers some 
special benefits are “designed to defeat rather than implement contractual 
arrangements.”). 
37  See 29 U.S.C. § 152 (noting that employee, as used in the Act, shall apply only to 
those that meet the definition as defined therein). 
38  See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (enumerating the power of the federal government to 
regulate commerce among states, foreign Nations, and Indian Tribes). 
39  See National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151. (2019). 
40  National Labor Relations Act, NLRB, https://www.nlrb.gov/how-we-work/ 
national-labor-relations-act (last visited Oct. 8, 2020). 
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salaries.41 However, the act defines “employer” as ‘‘any person acting as an 
agent of an employer, directly or indirectly,” and applies to all employers, with 
a few exceptions. 42 It was first noted by Justice Brennan that the NLRA defines 
“employer” as any person not within one of the eight expressed exceptions.43 
Likewise, the term “employee,” as defined by the NLRA, is broad. It 
“includes any employee and” is not “limited to the employees of a particular 
employer, unless” the act explicitly provides for an exception.44 With regards to 
the NLRA, a person can be “one or more individuals, labor organizations, 
partnerships, associations, corporations, legal representatives, trustees, trustees 
in cases under title 11, or receivers.”45  
The National Labor Relations Board has interpreted the applicability of the 
NLRA broadly so that it may live up to the protective nature of the act.46 
Moreover, courts have found that the NLRA is to be broadly interpreted, rather 
than relying on legal classifications.47 An employment relationship exists can 
 
41  Employer, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, 471(5th ed. 1979) (defines “employer” as 
follows: Employer. One who employs the services of others; one for whom 
employees work and who pays their wages or salaries. The correlative of 
“employee.”). 
42  29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (2020). The Act does not include the United States or wholly 
owned Government corporations, the Federal Reserve Bank, states and their political 
subdivisions, persons subject to the Railway Labor Act, labor organizations (except 
for when the organization is acting as an employer), and persons acting in the 
capacity of officer or agent of such a labor organization.  
43  NLRB v. Cath. Bishop of Chi., 440 U.S. 490, 511 (1979) (Brennan, J., dissenting) 
(noting that NLRA § 2(2), 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (1976), provides: The term "employer" 
includes “any person acting as an agent of an employer, directly or indirectly, but 
shall not include the United States or any wholly owned Government corporation, or 
any Federal Reserve Bank, or any State or political subdivision thereof, or any person 
subject to the Railway Labor Act, as amended from time to time, or any labor 
organization (other than when acting as an employer), or anyone acting in the 
capacity of officer or agent of such labor organization.”). 
44  29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (2020). Such exceptions include any persons employed as an 
agricultural laborer, by their parent or spouse, in the domestic service of another at 
the home, or by a person who is not an employer as defined, any independent 
contractor, or any person employed by an employer subject to the Railway Labor 
Act. 
45  29 U.S.C. § 152(1) (2020). 
46  See DR Horton, Inc., No. 184, 357 NLRB 2278, 2279 (2012). (determining that 
workers who join class actions to seek redress of FLSA violations is protected under 
the NLRA); see also Charles A. Sullivan & Timothy P. Glynn, Horton Hatches the 
Egg: Concerted Action Includes Concerted Dispute Resolution, 64 ALA. L. 
REV. 1013 (2013). 
47  See NLRB v. Washington Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9 (1962). (finding that section 
7 rights provide broad support to employees seeking to act in concert for collective 
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exist as a matter of common law or economic reality.48 Therefore, when 
determining employee status, one must look to the economic reality of the 
situation in addition to" the technical and traditional concepts of employer and 
employee.49 The “common law agency” test looks to whether the worker is 
controlled by the employer and the degree to which the worker is controlled.50 
Specifically, who has the right to control what the workers do, when or where 
the workers perform the services, and how the services are performed. If the 
alleged employer has the right to exercise control over the worker or if the worker 
perform services subject to the control of the alleged employer, then the worker 
should be classified as an employee.51 The key to the agency analysis is whether 
the alleged employer has the ability to control the worker or impede the worker’s 
 
bargaining and for mutual aid and protection. The court held that a group of 
employees who walked off the job because the workplace premises were too cold 
were protected by Section 7 of the Act; see also W.W. Cross & Co. v. NLRB., 174 
F.2d 875, 878 (1st Cir. 1949) (“in view of the general purpose and policy of the Act 
that Congress did not intend to restrict the duty to bargain collectively only to those 
subjects which up to 1935 had been commonly bargained about in negotiations 
between employers and employees. On the contrary we think that Congress intended 
to impose upon employers a duty to bargain collectively with their employees' 
representatives with respect to any matter which might in the future emerge as a bone 
of contention between them, provided, of course, it should be a matter ‘in respect to 
rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other conditions of employment.’”). 
48  See 211: Who is an Employee Under Federal and State Laws?, in Prin. Payroll 
Admin. 211 (2020), Westlaw 21790685; see also Hopkins v. Cornerstone Am., 545 
F.3d 338, 343 (5th Cir. 2008) (noting that an employment relationship exists where 
a worker is, “as a matter of economic reality, … economically dependent upon the 
alleged employer.”).  
49  See NLRB v. E.C. Atkins & Co., 331 U.S. 398, 403–04 (1947) (noting that 
analysis of the employee and employer relationship should not be confined to the 
technical and traditional concepts of employee and employer, and that it should take 
into account the economic reality of the situation). 
50  Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 323-24 (1992) (citing 
Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 751–752 (1989)) (“In 
determining whether a hired party is an employee under the general common law of 
agency, we consider the hiring party's right to control the manner and means by 
which the product is accomplished. Among the other factors relevant to this inquiry 
are the skill required; the source of the instrumentalities and tools; the location of the 
work; the duration of the relationship between the parties; whether the hiring party 
has the right to assign additional projects to the hired party; the extent of the hired 
party's discretion over when and how long to work; the method of payment; the hired 
party's role in hiring and paying assistants; whether the work is part of the regular 
business of the hiring party; whether the hiring party is in business; the provision of 
employee benefits; and the tax treatment of the hired party. … setting forth 20 factors 
as guides in determining whether an individual qualifies as a common-law 
‘employee’ in various tax law contexts.”). 
51  Id.  
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independence by which the work is performed.52 Whereas, the “economic 
reality” test looks at whether the worker follows the usual path of an employee 
and is economically dependent on the business he serves.53 If the worker is 
economically dependent on the business which he serves, the worker should be 
classified as an employee.54  
 
2. Are Professional League of Legends and Overwatch Players 
Employees Under the NLRA?  
 
There is no simple way to determine whether an entity is an employer, or 
whether a professional eSports player is even an employee. The standard for 
determining when separate entities are employers is constantly changing.55 An 
actor qualifies as an employer when it possesses sufficient control over the 
employees.56 Specifically, actors are employers of a workforce when the actors 
are employers within the meaning of the common law and can decide on matters 
governing essential terms and conditions of employment.57 The game producers, 
an alter ego of the league, exercises control over the terms and conditions of 
employment indirectly through the teams and significantly affect the 
professional players’ terms and conditions of employment. 
An inquiry into the employer’s ability to control the worker requires an 
examination of the characteristics of the employment relationship.58 These 
characteristics may include, but are not limited to: how payment for the services 
is determined; whether benefits are provided by the employer; whether the 
employer controls the manner and means by which the work is to be 
accomplished; who chooses where the work is to be performed; who provides 
the tools and materials to perform the work and whether the relationship is 
 
52  See NLRB v. O’Hare-Midway Limousine Serv., 924 F.2d 692, 694 (7th Cir. 1991) 
(noting that the “inquiry centers on the employer’s ability to control the purported 
employee,” which is determined based on a numerous factors); Local 777 
Democratic Union Org. Comm. v. NLRB, 603 F.2d 862, 874 (D.C. Cir. 1978) 
(“Control exercised over the ‘manner and means of performance’, not merely the 
economic controls which many corporations are able to exercise over independent 
contractors with whom they contract, is the identifying characteristic of an 
employer/employee relationship.”). 
53   211: Who is an Employee Under Federal and State Laws?, supra note 48. 
54  Id. 
55  See Browning-Ferris Indus. of Cal. v. NLRB, No. 16-1028  
(D.C. Cir. 2018) (revising the standard for determining when two or more separate 
organizations employ the same employees.)  
56  Id. 
57  Id. at 1200-1201. 
58  See NLRB. v. O’Hare-Midway Limousine Serv., Inc., 924 F.2d 692, 694,  
(7th Cir. 1991) (“The word ‘control’ suggests the need for an examination of many 
characteristics of an employer-worker relationship.”). 
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temporary or permanent.59 
Thus, the analysis of whether a worker, a professional League of Legends or 
Overwatch player in this case, is an employee or an independent contractor 
centers on whether Riot Games or Blizzard Entertainment exercises sufficient 
control over them.60  
When it comes to professional League of Legends play, video game 
publisher Riot Games appears to be pulling all the strings. In professional League 
of Legends play, the LCS determines a mandatory salary at the beginning of each 
season.61 In addition to the mandatory salary, the LCS has mandated that teams 
provide benefits, including healthcare and 401(k) retirement plans, for their 
players.62 Further, the LCS exercises sole and absolute discretion and may use 
any form of punitive actions at their disposal against teams and/or players for 
activity that it feels constitutes a violation of the rules, misconduct, unfair play, 
offensive, or simply not within the confines of the best interests of the LCS.63 In 
essence, Riot Games is able to control the means and manner of the professional 
player and team’s performance by imposing restrictions on what they could or 
 
59  Id. (These characteristics include: “how payment for services is determined; 
whether the employer provides benefits; who provides the tools and other materials 
to perform the work; who designates where work is done and whether the relationship 
is temporary or permanent.”). 
60  Id. (noting the employer-employee relationship revolves around the employer’s 
ability to control the purported employee). 
61  See North America League of  
Legends Championship Series: 2017 Season Official Rules, § 2.2, (Mar. 27, 2017), 
https://esports-assets.s3.amazonaws.com/production/files/rules/2017-Summer-
LCS-Rule-Set-v1.pdf (stating that starting players must receive a minimum of 
$12,500 for each split); See also Kieran Darcy,  
Riot’s Players’ Association Lays Groundwork for Unionization, ESPN (June 12, 
2017), https://www.espn.com/esports/story/_/id/19617991/riot-players-association-
lays-groundwork-unionization (stating that the minimum player salary is being 
increased to $75,000 with the new NA LCS reboot, and the players are guaranteed at 
least thirty-five percent of league revenues, which could lead to bonus payments).  
62  See Jacob Wolf, Riot Plans to Mandate Teams Give Players Employee Benefits, 
ESPN (Nov. 1, 2016), https://www.espn.com/esports/story/_/id/17945538/league-
legends-riot-plans-mandate-teams-give-players-employee-benefits (Riot Games, the 
developer of League of Legends and tournament organizer for the LCS, planned to 
mandate that all teams participating in its North American and European League 
Championship Series competitions contractually employ their players and coaching 
staff beginning with the 2017 season). 
63 See North America League of Legends Championship  
Series: 2017 Season Official Rules, §§ 10.4, 10.5, (Mar. 27, 2017), https://esports-
assets.s3.amazonaws.com/production/files/rules/2017-Summer-LCS-Rule-Set-
v1.pdf (stating that the LCS has sole and absolute discretion in regard to disciplinary 
action and that the LCS may, without any limitations, issue a multitude of penalties 
for what it considers to be “unfair play”). 
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could not do and directing them to that end. However, it must be noted that 
despite Riot Games’ ability to control the means and manner of the performance 
of the work, Riot Games does not directly exercise control over the professional 
players’ training regimen, team strategies, team dynamics and so on. Still, such 
control is akin to the type of control exerted by employers over employees. 
Riot Games exerts its control and influence on professional League of 
Legends players through the LCS not only by dictating the payment for services, 
benefits provided, conduct and activities of players, but also by dictating where 
the work is to be performed and by providing the tools and materials to perform 
the work.64 Since the inception of professional League of Legends play, Riot 
Games, through the LCS, has selected the venues where professional League of 
Legends events will take place.65 Moreover, the LCS has provided the needed 
equipment for players to perform their work at these events.66 Necessary 
equipment includes personal computers and monitors, hand warmers, headsets 
and/or earbuds, microphones, tables and chairs, keyboards, personal computer 
mice, and mousepads.67 It must be noted that the use of these LCS-provided 
equipment is not optional, as the LCS has expressly stated in their rules and 
regulations that “LCS players will exclusively use” the equipment provided.68 
Another tool that Riot Games and the LCS have provided is the League of 
Legends game client; this tool is also mandatory.69 The LCS makes it so that 
players must use the League of Legends client to perform their work.70 For 
professional League of Legends players to compete at events, practice, or 
perform any work related to the professional League of Legends play, they must 
access the game client.71 Thus, all work for professional play in League of 
Legends is bound to the game client.  
The control Riot Games has on professional players extends far beyond the 
 
64 Hunter A. Bayliss, Not Just a Game: The Employment Status and Collective 
Bargaining Rights of Professional Esports Players, 22 WASH. & LEE J. CIV. RTS. & 
SOC. JUST. 359, 386 (2016).  
65 See North America League of Legends Championship Series: 2017 Season Official 
Rules, §§ 7, 11, (Mar. 27, 2017), (requiring players to attend LCS events at the time 
and location determined by LCS officials). 
66  See id. § 5 (discussing LCS-provided equipment and requiring players to 
exclusively use the LCS-provided equipment). 
67  See id. (listing all the categories of equipment provided to players). 
68  See id. § 5.1 (“LCS officials will provide, and LCS players will exclusively use, 
equipment”). 
69  See id. § 5.6. 
70  See id. § 10.2.8 (noting that the LCS or Riot Games may punish players who do 
not adhere to the League of Legends Terms of Use or End User License Agreement, 
which prohibits the use of the client through providers not approved by Riot). 
71  See Riot Games Terms of Service § 2.3, RIOT GAMES (last modified Jan. 15, 2020), 
https://www.riotgames.com/en/terms-of-service (If a user’s account is terminated or 
cannot access the client, then he/she would not be able to play the game). 
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work within the LCS. Riot Games holds the intellectual property to the League 
of Legends game and it places stringent restrictions on the commercial use of the 
intellectual property by its players and the role sponsors play with teams and 
players.72 Riot Games has their own sponsors, and in order to protect the business 
interest of the company and its sponsors, it dictates what equipment are used, 
what advertisements are played, and what players and teams can promote or wear 
during the game.73 Above all, is the fact that this relationship that the LCS has 
with its players and teams can be permanent if the team maintains a high level of 
play.74 
Similarly, when it comes to professional Overwatch play, video game 
publisher Blizzard Entertainment is pulling all the strings in that game. In 
professional Overwatch play, the OWL determines the mandatory minimum 
salary for professional players.75 The OWL has set a requirement for team 
franchises that the player agreements must provide for an annual salary and that 
a professional player’s first year salary must be a minimum of $50,000.00 USD.76 
In addition to the mandatory salary, the OWL has mandated that teams provide 
employer-sponsored health insurance, housing, retirement savings plans, training 
support, and other benefits as standard player contract terms.77 In addition, 
Blizzard Entertainment has mandated that team franchises provide their players 
 
72  See Paul Tassi, Riot Games and TSM Are Going at It over ‘League of Legends’ 
 eSports Policies, FORBES (Aug. 24, 2016), https://www.forbes.com/sites/insertcoin/ 
2016/08/24/the-owners-of-riot-games-and-tsm-are-going-at-it-over-league-of-
legends-esports-policies/#18c56985fdc3 ("Over time, LCS has become more 
demanding and restrictive and the dynamics of a mutually beneficial relationship 
have become more one-sided. LCS told team sponsors, which are a necessary source 
of revenue, that they can’t even go backstage to watch the players compete. Teams 
can’t have sponsor branding on beverages or hats. Logitech is one of our greatest and 
most supportive sponsors and they simply can’t get visibility through us competing 
in LCS because we can’t wear their headsets while competing. We had to push 
endlessly to get permission for our staff simply to be able to film backstage. LCS 
even threatened to fine us if we didn’t remove sponsor content from our YouTube 
channel, such as [an] HTC commercial.”). 
73  See id. 
74  See About League of Legends Champion Series,  
RIOT GAMES, http://eu.lolesports.com/about/about-lol-esports (last visited Oct. 16, 
2019) (noting that the last team in the LCS bracket is relegated to the challenger 
series). 
75 See Kevin Webb, Eight Teams Paid More than $30 Million Each to Join the 
Overwatch League – Here's Everything You  
Need to Know Before the New Season Starts, BUSINESS INSIDER (Dec. 29, 2018),  
https://www.businessinsider.com/overwatch-league-season-2-2018-9. 
76   See id. (noting the minimum salary and benefits that OWL players will receive). 
77  See id. 
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with bonuses representing at least half of the team’s winnings and revenue.78  
Not only is Blizzard Entertainment dictating the contract terms between 
teams and players, but it also exercises sole and absolute discretion when it 
comes to disciplinary or administrative actions.79 Blizzard Entertainment has set 
forth a code of conduct and the professional players within the OWL are expected 
to follow it while playing and representing the league.80 Those who violate the 
rules set by Blizzard Entertainment may face disciplinary action from Blizzard 
Entertainment, including suspension, fines, and even a permanent ban from 
competition.81 For example, Felix “xQc” Lengyel, a former member of the Dallas 
Fuel team, was suspended by the Blizzard Entertainment and OWL for four 
games  for making disparaging comments about another player.82 Like Riot 
Games, Blizzard Entertainment controls the means and manner of the 
professional players’ and teams’ performance by imposing restrictions on what 
they could and directing them to that end. This type of control is typically found 
in employer-employee relationships and is exerted by employers over 
employees. 
In addition to the traditional agency analysis of the employer’s ability to 
control the worker, the economic reality must also be considered when 
determining whether a worker is an employee.83 Courts have set out some factors 
that they consider in determining whether the worker is economically dependent 
on the business which he serves.84 The factors considered include: “(1) the degree 
of control exercised by the alleged employer; (2) the extent of the relative 
investments of the worker and alleged employer; (3) the degree to which the 
 
78  Player Signings, Salaries, and More in the Overwatch League, BLIZZARD ENTM’T.  
(July 26, 2017), https://overwatchleague.com/en-us/news/20937016 (stating that 
players will receive at least fifty percent of their team’s performance bonuses). 
79  The Overwatch League, Overwatch League Player Discipline Tracker, BLIZZARD 
ENTM’T. (Dec. 21, 2018), https://overwatchleague.com/en-us/news/22823906/2019-
player-discipline-tracker (listing players who are disciplined for infractions of the 
Overwatch League rules of competition and code of conduct). 
80  Id. 
81   Nicole Carpenter, OWL Commissioner Nate Nanzer: “Of Course We‘d  be 
Supportive of a Players’ Union,” DOT ESPORTS (Mar. 15, 2018, 5:47 PM), https://dot 
esports.com/general/news/overwatch-league-nate-nanzer-interview-21932. 
82  Richard Lawler, ‘Overwatch’ Pro Suspended for ‘Racially Disparaging’ Emote, 
ENGADGET (Mar. 9, 2018), https://www.engadget.com/2018/03/09/overwatch-pro-
suspended-again-for-racially-disparaging-emote (noting that players were punished 
for in-game actions, actions while streaming, and comments on social media).  
83  See Brown v. NLRB, 462 F.2d 699, 703 (9th Cir. 1972) (noting that control is not 
the only factor to consider); see also NLRB v. E.C. Atkins & Co., 331 U.S. 398, 
403–04 (1947) (noting that analysis of the employee and employer relationship 
should not be confined to the technical and traditional concepts of employee and 
employer, and that it should take into account the economic reality of the situation). 
84  See Reich v. Circle C. Invs., 998 F.2d 324, 327 (5th Cir. 1993) (listing several 
factors used to measure the degree of the worker’s dependency). 
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worker’s opportunity for profit and loss is determined by the alleged employer; 
(4) the skill and initiative required in performing the job; and (5) the permanency 
of the relationship.”85 Some of these considerations, such as degree of control, 
the skill required in performing the job, and the permanency of the relationship, 
overlap with the previous analysis and will not be re-considered.  
The remaining factor that needs to be examined is the degree to which the 
worker’s opportunity for profit and loss is determined by the alleged employer.86 
Although numerous professional League of Legends players receive income 
from other activities, such as streaming,87 the money they receive from their team 
and the LCS is their only sources of guaranteed income. Professional League of 
Legends players can increase or decrease their income through their 
performance. 88 They can increase it by placing in tournaments and securing 
tournament winnings or decrease it by failing to place in tournaments and/or 
being kicked out of the LCS.89 Therefore, a professional player’s actual ability 
to manipulate their profit or loss is limited and is completely dependent on the 
LCS. 
Likewise, in the OWL, the opportunity for profit and loss is determined by 
the game publisher. The money professional Overwatch players receive from 
their team and the OWL is their only sources of guaranteed income and is 
determined by Blizzard Entertainment.90 Overwatch players, like their League of 
Legends counterparts, are limited in the ways they can manipulate their earnings 
and are dependent on the OWL for the opportunity for profit.    
Notwithstanding the fact that players are more closely connected with their 
teams and are likely employees of their respective teams, there is a high 
probability that Riot Games and Blizzard Entertainment could be classified as 
alter ego employers. When weighing the factors of control and the economic 
reality of professional League of Legends and Overwatch players, the balance 
tips in favor of classifying professional League of Legends and Overwatch 
 
85  Id. (indicating that these factors merely assist in determining the question of 
dependency, and that no single factor is determinative). 
86  Id. (stating that the degree of control over a worker’s opportunity for profit or loss 
is a factor in the employment analysis). 
87  Patrick Kobek, How Much Do Competitive Esports Players Make?, THEGAMER 
(Sept. 29, 2019), https://www.thegamer.com/competitive-esports-players-salary/. 
88  See LCS/2019 Season, GAMEPEDIA (last visited Oct. 6, 2020), https://lol.game 
pedia.com/LCS/2019_Season (providing the data on the distribution of the prizes 
winnings in the playoffs). 
89  See id. 
90 Noah Higgens-Dunn, Six-Figure Salaries, Million-Dollar Prizes, Health Benefits 
and Housing Included—Inside the Overwatch League, CNBC (Sept. 29, 2019), 
https://www.cnbc.com/2019/09/29/what-its-like-to-be-a-professional-gamer-in-the-
overwatch-league.html. 
140 UNLV GAMING LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 11:1 
players as employees of their respective league.91 Both the LCS and OWL exerts 
a significant amount of control over the management of professional players 
through its ability to impose penalties such as fines, suspensions and bans.92 
Further, the economic reality of the relationship between the two leagues and 
their professional players, suggests that the professional players are reliant upon 
their respective league organizers for guaranteed income and employment.93 
Thus, the argument that professional League of Legends and Overwatch players 
are independent contractors and independent contractor agreements will likely 
not survive legal scrutiny.      
 
IV. ANALYSIS: WHAT EMPLOYMENT BENEFITS AND RIGHTS 
PROFESSIONAL PLAYERS CURRENTLY LACK AND THE POTENTIAL 
BENEFITS FOR THE ACTORS INVOLVED. 
 
A. Benefits of Employee Status for Professional Players in League of 
Legends and Overwatch. 
Under the current contractual framework, professional League of Legends 
and Overwatch players are receiving minimum wage, benefits, and other 
advantages of employment. With this under consideration, why should 
professional players in League of Legends or Overwatch seek employment 
 
91  See NLRB v. O’Hare-Midway Limousine Serv., 924 F.2d 692, 694–95 (7th Cir. 
1991) (listing the control factors); Brown, supra note 83, at 703 (noting the economic 
realities factors); E.C. Atkins, supra note 83, at 403–04 (explaining the concern with 
economic reality). 
92  North America League of Legends Academy  
League: 2018 Official Rules, version 18.05, § 15 (Jan. 11, 2018), https://esports-
assets.s3.amazonaws.com/production/files/rules/2018_LCS_LACS_Rules.pdf 
(stating that the LCS and Riot Games have sole discretion to determine whether a 
team or player has violated the Summoner’s Code, the League of Legends Terms of 
Use, or other rules of League of Legends, and may issue penalties for such conduct 
at their sole discretion as well); Overwatch League Summary of Official Rules 2019 
Season, §§2–3, https://bnetcmsus-a.akamaihd.net/cms/content_entry_media/ 
bb/BB6C3OEC530B1549590044543.pdf (stating that the OWL approves the 
process used to select which players will be eligible to participate in OWL games 
and that it is responsible for “creating, amending, modifying, interpreting, and/or 
applying all or any of the Official Rules”). 
93  North America League of Legends Championship Series: 2017 Season Official 
Rules, supra note 61, §2.2 (stating that starting players must receive a minimum of 
$12,500 for each split); Player Signings, Salaries, and More in the Overwatch 
League, supra note 78 (stating that teams will sign players to a one-year guaranteed 
contract with the option to extend the contract; the minimum salary for players is 
$50,000 per year; players will be provided with health insurance and a retirement 
plan; and players will receive at least fifty percent of their team’s performance 
bonuses). 
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status? The answer is simple: to protect their rights and what they currently have, 
and to improve upon it and securing a better future for them.  
Although professional League of Legends and Overwatch players are 
receiving better terms and conditions for their employment than they have in the 
past, they still face significant issues concerning their employment. Some of 
these issues that professional eSports players face, with respect to their 
employment, are identical to those faced by traditional sports players. They 
include a balanced daily work schedule, as professional League of Legends and 
Overwatch players practice fifty hours a week on average94; post-career 
development; medical insurance; quality and term of housing, as many game 
publishers provide housing during the season; and the rights to their intellectual 
property, such as image and likeness. 
The employment laws in the United States were mainly enacted for the 
purposes of protecting the general welfare of employees and fostering success in 
commerce by curtailing labor and management practices that caused industrial 
strife and unrest.95 To this end, the National Labor Relations Act is designated to 
protect the “exercise by workers of full freedom of association, self-organization, 
and designation of representatives of their own choosing for the purpose of 
negotiating the terms and conditions of their employment or other mutual aid or 
protection.”96 The National Labor Relations Act accomplishes this by means of 
restricting employer actions.97 Unfortunately for professional eSports players, 
the collective bargaining provisions of the National Labor Relations Act are not 
satisfied in any form.98 Thus, the National Labor Relations Act has a great 
potential of impact for professional League of Legends and Overwatch players.  
The core of the Nation Labor Relations Act is Chapter 7, which contains the 
rights of employees as to self-organization, collective bargaining, and concerted 
 
94  Harrison Jacobs, Here’s the Insane Training Schedule of a 20-Something 
Professional Gamer, BUSINESS INSIDER (May 11, 2015, 10:05 AM), https://www. 
businessinsider.com/pro-gamers-explain-the-insane-training-regimen-they-use-to-
stay-on-top-2015-5. 
95  See 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2011) (noting that the broad purposes behind the enactment 
of the NLRA was to protect workers and businesses by curtailing the causes for 
industrial strife and unrest, which burdens or obstructs the efficiency of commerce 
and causes the diminution of employment and wages). 
96  Id; see also 7 NLRB ANN. REP. 42 (1942). 
97  See generally 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2011) (stating the broad purposes underlying the 
enactment of the NLRA, including protecting employer rights by prohibiting some 
employer action). 
98  See Richard Lewis, How Fair is an  
LCS Contract? We Asked a Lawyer, DOT ESPORTS (Sept. 22, 2014, 6:51 AM), 
https://dotesports.com/league-of-legends/news/lcs-contract-analysis-league-of-
legends-riot-games-682 (discussing that labor laws are not addressed or even 
considered in contracts signed between teams and players). 
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activities.99 In particular, Section 157 provides that:  
 
employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, 
join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively 
through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in 
other concerted activities for the purpose of collective 
bargaining or other mutual aid, and shall also have the right to 
refrain from any or all of such activities.100  
Any interference with this right would constitute an unfair labor practice by 
an employer.101 However, not all matters of employment are subject to collective 
bargaining.102 The National Labor Relations Act allows collective bargaining on 
matters relating to “wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of 
employment.”103 However, it does not mean that the National Labor Relations 
Act only covers and is restricted to subjects commonly bargained about between 
employers and employees up until the enactment of the National Labor Relations 
Act.104 In fact, mandatory subjects of collective bargaining go beyond that and 
extend to subjects that deal with a characteristic of the employer-employee 
relationship.105 Thus, being recognized as an employee under the National Labor 
Relations Act, will guarantee professional players the right to collectively 
bargain on issues that settle an aspect of the employment relationship, including 
 
99  See 29 U.S.C. §157 (2016). 
100  Id. 
101  See 29 U.S.C. §158 (2015). 
102  See id. (stating that unfair labor practices occur only when certain terms are not 
subject to collective bargaining). 
103  29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (2015); see also Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 
U.S. 203, 209–10 (1964) (noting that employers have an obligation to meet and 
confer in good faith with respect to matters concerning wages, hours, and other terms 
and conditions of employment); see also NLRB. v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner 
Corp., 356 U.S. 342, 349 (1958) (noting that the mandatory subjects of collective 
bargaining are outlined in section 158(d) of the NLRA); see also NLRB v. Boss Mfg. 
Co., 118 F.2d 187, 189 (7th Cir. 1941) (noting that employees may use collective 
bargaining to address wages, hours, and other conditions of employment); see also 
Wilson & Co. v. NLRB, 115 F.2d 759, 763 (8th Cir. 1940) (noting the employer’s 
obligation to bargain in good faith with a majority representative of the employer’s 
employees on wages, hours, and other working conditions). 
104  See W.W. Cross & Co. v. NLRB, 174 F.2d 875, 878 (1st Cir. 1949) (“[W]e think 
in view of the general purpose and policy of the Act that Congress did not intend to 
restrict the duty to bargain collectively only to those subjects which up to 1935 had 
been commonly bargained about in negotiations between employers and 
employees.”). 
105  See Allied Chem. & Alkali Workers, Loc. Union No. 1 v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass 
Co., 404 U.S. 157, 178 (1971) (“[O]nly issues that settle an aspect of the relationship 
between the employer and employees” are mandatory subjects of bargaining).  
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but not limited to pay, work hours, other terms and conditions related to 
employment, and any issue that settles an aspect of the relationship between 
employers and employees.   
Even if professional League of Legends and Overwatch players are entitled 
to collective bargaining under the National Labor Relations Act, the players may 
very well choose to not enter a bargaining unit. Currently, there is not a 
significant division between the policies within the leagues and the players who 
are involved in the professional play of their respective video games.106 Many of 
the typical bargaining subjects, such as wages and benefits, have been taken care 
of by the current eSports framework.107 It would appear that professional players 
would have no reason to even consider such propositions as collective 
bargaining. Albeit the contentedness of the professional League of Legends and 
Overwatch players, there is one subject that they may want to, or should want to, 
have addressed through collective bargaining: administrative actions. That is 
because professional players currently have next to no rights at all with regards 
to administrative actions, and this subject can have dire negative impact on 
players, as administrative actions can potentially ruin a player’s career.108 More 
importantly, the players have to accept any and all rulings issued by the leagues 
and have no recourse for redress.109 
 
106  See North America League of Legends Championship Series and North America 
League of Legends Academy League: 2018 Official Rules, supra note 91, at 1(noting 
the purpose of the rules is to foster a healthy eSports scene by ensuring “the integrity 
of the system established by the League for professional play of [League of Legends] 
and a competitive balance among the teams that play at the professional level.”; 
further noting the standardized rules benefit all parties who are involved in the 
professional play of League of Legends.). 
107  See North America League of Legends Championship Series: 2017 Season 
Official Rules, supra note 61, §2.2 (stating that starting players must receive a 
minimum of $12,500 for each split); see also Kieran Darcy, supra note 61 (stating 
that the minimum player salary is being increased to $75,000 with the new NA LCS 
reboot and the players are guaranteed at least thirty-five percent of league revenues, 
which could lead to bonus payments); see also Jacob Wolf, supra note 62 (Riot 
Games, the developer of League of Legends and tournament organizer for the LCS, 
planned to mandate that all teams participating in its North American and European 
League Championship Series competitions contractually employ their players and 
coaching staff beginning with the 2017 season). 
108  See Samuel Lingle, Two ‘League of Legends’ Pros Banned After Using Racist 
Slurs, DOT ESPORTS (June 2, 2014, 11:40 AM), https://dotesports.com/league-of-
legends/news/mithy-nukeduck-banned-league-of-legends-362 (noting that two 
professional players were suspended from playing League of Legends, which 
prevents them from working as professional players). 
109  See North America League of Legends Championship Series and North America 
League of Legends Academy League: 2018 Season Official Rules, supra note 91, 
§ 16.1 (noting all decisions regarding the interpretation of the rules, player eligibility, 
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The rules enacted by these league organizers are unfair, even oppressive, in 
that it gives the league organizers sole control and absolute discretion to 
administrative decisions.110 For example, in the official LCS rules it states, in no 
uncertain terms, that the LCS has the sole power and right to all decisions 
regarding the interpretation of the rules, player eligibility, and penalties for 
misconduct.111 Not only that, but the LCS rules goes so far as to indicate that all 
decisions “with respect to [the] rules cannot be appealed (except as set forth in 
the League Operating Manual) and shall not give rise to any claim for monetary 
damages or any other legal or equitable remedy.”112 The only means for a player 
to overturn a ruling issued by the LCS is through a review process.113 
Unfortunately, this review process is also under the sole and absolute discretion 
of the LCS.114 Furthermore, league organizers such as the LCS, do not explicitly 
provide the guidelines that is supposedly in force during the review process to 
the players.115 Instead, the LCS explained that they apply “general principles” in 
their case reviews and that the review “may vary from case-to-case” because 
there is “no one-size-fits-all answer for every case.”116 These rulings can have 
dire effects and consequences on professional players, who rely on the ability to 
play for income. Although the LCS claims to conduct thorough investigations 
and reviews of complaints, these claims cannot be verified or challenged by 
players as the exact nature of the investigation or review is not disclosed.117 As 
such, the rulings issued by the LCS can seem unfair and arbitrary at times.  
However, with a collective bargaining process that includes professional 
 
as well as penalties for misconduct, are solely with the League and are final. These 
decisions cannot be appealed). 
110  See, § 16; see also Overwatch League – Summary of Official Rules 2019 Season, 
supra note 91. 
111  See North America League of Legends Championship Series and North America 
League of Legends Academy League: 2018 Season Official Rules, supra note 91, 
§ 16.1 (noting all decisions regarding the interpretation of the rules, player eligibility, 
as well as penalties for misconduct, are solely with the League and are final). 
112  See id. 
113  See Nick Allen,  
Competitive Policy Revision: Permabanned Players, LOLESPORTS (Nov. 20, 2014), 
http://na.lolesports.com/articles/competitive-policy-revision-permabanned-players 
[https://web.archive.org/web/20141205111251]  
(explaining that players who are eligible for review will be reviewed by the LCS 
Operations Team). 
114  See id. 
115  See id. 
116  Id. 
117  See League of Legends Esports Staff, End-Of- 
Suspension Review: Erlend “NukeDuck” Holm, RIOT GAMES, (last visited Oct. 11, 
2020), https://nexus.leagueoflegends.com/en-us/2014/12/end-of-suspension-review-
erlend-nukeduckholm (announcing that the suspension of Erlend Holm has been 
lifted after he showed “drastic improvement” to his behavior in game). 
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players, a more open and transparent disciplinary system can be created. This 
would serve to further legitimize the eSports space as a real sporting event.118 
Further, and more importantly, this would provide the professional players with 
the security that they much desire. 
 
B. How to Secure the Win: Develop a System Similar to that of the 
NBA’s 
As one can glean from the description of the LCS review process, it is 
unusual when compared to other professional sports. For instance, in the NBA, 
players’ misconduct is taken care of in accordance to Article 35 of the NBA 
Constitution.119 Under the NBA Constitution, these decisions by the league are 
appealable to either the Board of Governors or an arbitrator, which is more fair 
and less biased.120  
The NBA’s arbitration procedure is more fair and less biased because it has 
an extensive list of safeguards that is provided within the National Basketball 
Players Association’s Collective Bargaining Agreement.121 The National 
Basketball Players Association’s Collective Bargaining Agreement outlines the 
rules and procedures for initiating grievances, filing pre-hearing motions, 
hearings, appeals, an arbitrator’s decision and award, appointing and replacing 
an arbitrator, and imposing fines and/or suspensions.122 Through these 
provisions, professional basketball players in the NBA are able to protect 
themselves from the risk of arbitrary or unfair disciplinary decisions.123 Although 
the system implemented within the NBA, like other professional sports, is not 
completely balanced between the needs of the players and the league, it still has 
far more protections for its players than the current systems in professional 
eSports.  
Professional LCS and OWL players could better protect themselves and 
enact similar provisions to those set out in the National Basketball Association—
 
118  See generally Haywood v. Nat’l Basketball Ass’n, 401 U.S. 1204 (1971) 
(Professional sports are subject to the jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations 
Board).  
119  See Nat’l Basketball Assoc., Const. and By-Laws of the Nat’l Basketball Assoc., 
Art. 35, https://atlhawksfanatic.github.io/NBA-BY-LAWS/constitution.html (noting 
that decisions and actions on misconduct may be appealed by teams to the Board of 
Governors, or by players to an arbitrator in accordance with Art. XXXI of the 
National Basketball Players Association Collective Bargaining Agreement). 
120  Id. 
121  See Nat’l Basketball Assoc.—Nat’l Basketball Players Assoc. Collective 
Bargaining Agreement, Art. XXXI (July 1, 2017), http://nbpa.com/cba/ (setting out 
that the arbitration procedure be followed by the Union and the Association). 
122  Id. 
123  See id. (specifying courses of action players may use to protect themselves from 
certain actions by the NBA). 
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National Basketball Players Association’s Collective Bargaining Agreement by 
means of collective bargaining. However, in order for LCS and OWL players to 
include administrative matters, such as disciplinary issues of players within the 
league, into a collective bargaining agreement, the professional players must 
show that the disciplinary system threatened rights outlined in the National Labor 
Rights Act.124 When determining whether such a disciplinary system threatened 
rights outlined in the National Labor Rights Act, courts consider a variety of 
factors, including whether the system is designed “almost entirely by employers 
and owners” and whether the final arbiter is a “neutral third party freely chosen 
by both sides.”125 In the case of the LCS and OWL, the disciplinary system is 
designed entirely by the respective league and involves a non-neutral arbiter.126 
Thus, a potential collective bargaining unit for professional League of Legends 
and Overwatch players could bargain with their respective leagues on 
administrative matters.127  
 
C. Win-Win Situation: Benefits of Classifying Professional Players as 
Employees for the LCS and OWL 
While employers may prefer to classify profession eSports players as 
independent contractors, the legal ramifications of a misclassification cannot be 
understated. Misclassification can subject the employer to significant 
liabilities.128 In the case of the LCS and OWL, as well as the eSports industry, it 
may subject the leagues and the game publishers to antitrust liability. 
The Sherman Antitrust Act makes illegal "[e]very contract, combination in 
the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce 
among the several States, or with foreign nations.”129 The Act applies to nearly 
all markets, and the Supreme Court has even held that professional sports, except 
baseball, are subject to federal antitrust laws.130 Section One of the Act prohibits 
 
124  See The Am. League of Prof’l Baseball Clubs, 180 N.L.R.B. No. 30 (1969) 
(noting that the major league baseball’s internal self-regulation system has not 
prevented labor issues from arising and that the NLRB could become involved if the 
disciplinary action promulgated by the arbitrators threatened rights protected under 
29 U.S.C. § 157).    
125  Id. at 191. 
126  See North America League of Legends Championship Series and North America 
League of Legends Academy League: 2018 Official Rules, supra note 91, § 15 
(stating that the LCS has sole discretion to modify and change the rules it has 
promulgated at any time). 
127  See The Am. League of Prof’l Baseball Clubs, 180 NLRB No. 30 (1969). 
128  This includes, and is not limited to, wage and hour and tax liabilities. 
129  15 U.S.C. § 1 (2018).  
130  See Radovich v. Nat’l Football League, 352 U.S. 445, 451-452 (1957) 
(acknowledging that football affects interstate commerce for the purposes of the 
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certain means of anti-competitive behavior and is broad enough to prohibit 
practically any restraint on free trade.131 Thus, the Supreme Court has interpreted 
the language of section one that only unreasonable restraints on trade are within 
the prohibitions of the Act.132 
In the eSports context, the drafting system, free agency, salary caps, and the 
various league rules can be a violation of section one of the Sherman Antitrust 
Act as they can be proscribed as unreasonable restraints on free trade. For 
example, the LCS has a rule that prevents professional League of Legends 
players from streaming or professionally playing other games, which has an anti-
competitive. This rule has an anti-competitive impact because it prevents players 
from selling professional video game playing services to various teams, leagues, 
or game publishers. In fact, it is akin to the NFL’s rule in North American Soccer 
League v National Football League, 670 F.2d 1249 (1982), which significantly 
decreased opportunities for team owners in the “professional sports capital and 
skill market.”133 Like in North American Soccer League, where there were fewer 
potential team owners because of the NFL’s rule and the restraints were found to 
have significant anti-competitive impact, here, the LCS restraints will result in 
fewer potential professional players for other leagues and video games because 
these other leagues and video games cannot use LCS players, and have a 
significant anti-competitive impact.  
It is worrisome for game publishers such as, Riot Games and Blizzard 
Entertainment, because the LCS and OWL have a whole handbook of rules, 
which may contain even more anti-competitive restraints. To justify these 
company requirements, in part, Riot’s director of eSports, RiotMagus, issued a 
statement expressing that Riot wants “League of Legends to be a legitimate 
sport” with a “true professional setting.”134 Further, RiotMagus stated that just 
as you probably would not see an NFL player promoting the Arena Football 
League or a Nike sponsored player wearing Reebok, he claimed that a League of 
Legends player should not be seen promoting DOTA 2 either.135 
With major traditional professional sports leagues, the antitrust issue is 
defined by the two main exemptions to the application of section one of the 
Sherman Antitrust Act.136 The first is the single entity exemption.137 To put it 
 
Sherman Antitrust Act); see also O’Dea, Professional Sports and the Antitrust Law, 
9 HASTINGS L.J. 18 (1957). 
131  See Continental TV, Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 49 (1977). 
132  See Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. U.S., 221 U.S. 1, 61-62 (1911). 
133  See North American Soccer League v. Nat’l Football League, 670 F.2d 1249 
(1982). 
134  Id. See also Pete Davison, Riot Bans League of Legends Pros from Streaming 
Rival Games, US GAMER, (Dec. 05, 2013) https://www.usgamer.net/articles/riot-
bans-league-of-legends-pros-from-streaming-rival-games. 
135  Id. 
136  See Gregory J. Pelnar, Antitrust Analysis of Sports Leagues, 73 (Oct. 12, 2007). 
137  Id. 
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simply, a group of actors that effectively acts as a single unified body and has a 
single economic interest is not in violation of section one because a single entity 
cannot conspire with itself.138 The management of the major traditional sports 
leagues claims that their respective league is a single entity.139 The NFL claims 
that the league would not be able to function if it did not have limitations on 
player acquisitions, player movement among the teams, player conduct, and so 
on.140 
The second is the statutory labor exemption created by the Norris-LaGuardia 
Act.141 This created an immunity for unilateral conduct that protects a union’s 
economic interest.142 For example, the NFL claims that the restrictions it imposes 
upon their players are valid under the statutory labor exemption because the 
restrictions were achieved through a collective bargaining agreement with the 
NFL players union.143 The statutory exemption created under the Norris-
LaGuardia Act shields employers from inherently anti-competitive collective 
activities by employees because these types of activities are favored by federal 
labor policy.144  
Like major traditional professional sports leagues, the antitrust issue in 
eSports is defined by the two main exemptions to the Sherman Antitrust Act as 
well. However, unlike major traditional professional sports leagues, the single 
entity exemption does not apply to eSports because there are too many different 
and competing economic interests at play.145 Under the current eSports model, 
the teams’ interest are not necessarily aligned because each team franchise is a 
separate profit-maximizing actor. Thus, it is not likely that the single entity 
exemption will be applicable in eSports. 
 Instead, the game publishers should seek protection under the statutory labor 
exemption created by the Norris-LaGuardia Act or the non-statutory labor 
exemptions for their anti-competitive activities. The statutory labor exemption 
created by the Norris-LaGuardia Act will shield game publishers from antitrust 
issues and allow them to continue with its drafting system, restrictions on free 
agency, mandatory salary caps, and the various league rules as long as it was 
achieved through a collective bargaining agreement with a players’ union.  
 
138  Id. 
139  See Michael S. Jacobs, Professional Sports Leagues, Antitrust, and the Single-
Entity Theory: A Defense of the Status Quo, 67 IND. L.J. 1 (1991). 
140  See American Needle v. NFL, 560 U.S. 183, 183 (2010). 
141  See 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-15 (1964). 
142   Employee Bargaining Power Under the Norris-Laguardia Act: The Independent 
Contractor Problem, 67 YALE L.J. 98, (1957). 
143  Brady v. NFL, 644 F.3d 661, 662-683 (8th Cir. 2011). 
144  Powell v. NFL, 678 F. Supp. 777, 782 (D. Minn. 1988); see also Thomas Picher, 
Baseball’s Antitrust Exemption Repealed: An Analysis of the Effect on Salary Cap 
and Salary Taxation Provisions, 7 SETON HALL J. SPORT & ENTM’T. L. 5, 12 (1997). 
145  There is the game publisher’s interest, the league’s interest, and the teams’ 
interest. 
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The non-statutory labor exemption to federal antitrust laws also removes the 
antitrust restraints that are the result of a collective bargaining agreement 
between employees and employers. Should the players be recognized as 
employees and unionize, the non-statutory labor exemption will allow them and 
their employers to bargain collectively, free from potential antitrust scrutiny.146 
In such cases, where players are recognized as employees and unionize, labor 
laws will govern the relationship between the players and the employers. 
Moreover, the employers will largely be free from the restraints of antitrust laws 
due to the non-statutory labor exemption. This means that the players would lose 
virtually all of the protections afforded by antitrust laws. 
However, for the non-statutory labor exemption to apply, the employers 
must engage in good faith and arm’s length negotiation with their employees on 
mandatory subjects of collective bargaining.147 These mandatory subjects of 
collective bargaining include hours, wages, and terms and conditions of 
employment.148 This protection is greatly desired by employers, because it 
shields them from most, if not all, of the challenges under the Sherman Antitrust 
Act. The protection employers avail themselves of under the non-statutory labor 
exemption will continue if the bargaining relationship continues to exist. As 
such, as soon as the professional players decertify their union, the bargaining 
process can be seen as having ended and the employers, which includes game 
publishers, may no longer enjoy the protections that the non-statutory labor 
exemption affords.  
 
V. TO AFK OR NOT TO AFK: WHAT SHOULD PROFESSIONAL ESPORTS 
PLAYERS DO IN THE INTERIM? 
 
The undertaking of unionizing is complex. There are practical and legal 
challenges in establishing a collective bargaining unit within the eSports 
industry. This includes the challenges of classifying professional eSports players 
as “employees” and garnering enough support from the professional players to 
form a union. For the time being, team owners and game developers are satisfied 
with the current system. Moreover, the issues that professional players are 
concerned about could be resolved without having to go through the arduous 
process of forming a union, by improving communication between game 
 
146  Fed. Baseball Club of Balt.. v. Nat’l League, 259 U.S. 200, 200 (1922). 
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respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, or the 
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developers, teams, and professional players. It remains to be seen whether 
professional eSports players will pursue unionization. However, observers of the 
eSports scene believe and agree that players’ unions are inevitable as the industry 
continues to grow.   
In the meantime, the professional League of Legends and Overwatch players 
can form a workers’ committee. The formation of a workers’ committee is less 
complex compared to the formation of a union and is an alternative to strengthen 
the workers’ clout and protections.149 The National Labor Relations Act prohibits 
employers from retaliating against workers for engaging in “concerted” activity 
to improve their wages and/or working conditions, even when the workers are 
not trying to unionize.150 Thus, by forming a workers’ committee, the 
professional players will be able to freely discuss matters that they wish to 
discuss with management, without the management’s interference.151 More 
importantly, the matters or issues brought up by the members of the workers’ 
committee can then be brought forward by a single entity, that has more influence 
and leverage, to members of management, as the workers’ committee can 




Esports is an emerging industry that is still in its infancy, however, it is 
quickly maturing and evolving. Like any new industry, the primary issues facing 
eSports actors, including organizations, employers, and employees, is applying 
existing laws and regulations to an industry that was never contemplated when 
the laws were written. Despite such complications, we can look to similar 
industries, such as the traditional professional sports industry, and use them as a 
guide for the eSports industry. The traditional professional sports industry has 
had many landmark cases that helped shape the industry, both from a legal and a 
financial position. 
The eSports industry has imitated the traditional professional sports scene in 
both form and the relationship between the professional players and their 
respective leagues. Both the LCS and OWL appear to significantly affect 
players’ terms and conditions of employment and exert sufficient control over 
their respective professional players so as to qualify those players as their 
employees. The recognition and establishment of employee status for 
professional players will give players benefits that truly mirror those found in 
traditional professional sports, including the right to collectively bargain. 
Because through collective bargaining, professional League of Legends and 
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Overwatch players will be able to push for fairer provisions under the player 
agreements and ensure better working conditions in the scene.   
To date, the National Labor Relations Board has not asserted jurisdiction 
over the eSports industry. Once the game publishers and leagues discover the 
potential for collective bargaining, they may eliminate many of the benefits 
currently provided to professional players and mandated by them, as an attempt 
to eliminate the employer-employee relationship. Such a move is short-sighted 
and can hurt the industry in the long run. Instead, by embracing the employee 
status of professional players, the LCS and OWL can accomplish their goal of 
legitimizing eSports, League of Legends and Overwatch in particular, as an 
actual sport. The LCS, OWL, and their respective professional players have the 
potential to shape the future of the eSports industry and set the industry standard 
for various labor and employment issues. For the good of the industry, game 
publishers and professional players should embrace the employee status of 
professional players and work together in securing a better future for everyone 
involved.    
 
